Makoto Kureha

Abstract

Robots that incorporate the function of apologizing have emerged in recent years. This paper examines the moral permissibility of making robots apologize. First, I characterize the nature of apology based on analyses conducted in multiple scholarly domains. Next, I present a prima facie argument that robot apologies are not permissible because they may harm human societies by inducing the misattribution of responsibility. Subsequently, I respond to a possible response to the prima facie objection based on the interpretation that attributing responsibility to a robot is analogous to having an attitude toward fiction. Then, I demonstrate that there are cases of robot apologies where the prima facie objection does not apply, by considering the following two points: (1) apology-related practices found in our human-to-human apologies, and (2) a difference in the degree of harm caused by robot failures and the resulting apologies. Finally, given the current norms governing our apology-related practices, I argue that some instances of making robots apologize are permissible, and I propose conducting critical robotics research questioning the validity of such norms.

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On the morality of artificial agents.a Luciano Floridi & J. W. Sanders - 2004 - Minds and Machines 14 (3):349-379.

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